Damien
75d10385d7
A fail2ban jail running inside a service's own LXC only ever sees this proxy's tailnet IP as the connection source, so it would end up banning the proxy itself. Detection needs to stay at the service's application log; banning needs to happen here, at the edge where public connections terminate. Adds a generic imtcp listener (port RSYSLOG_PORT, default 5514) that routes anything unclaimed by a later 50-<service>.conf into /var/log/remote/<sender-hostname>.log, plus logrotate with copytruncate so fail2ban never loses its file descriptor. No service-specific routing yet — that's one 50-<service>.conf per service, documented here for the next issue to follow. Refs #20
102 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
102 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
# Proxy Server
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Deploys a secure reverse proxy with Tailscale + Nginx Proxy Manager.
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## Quick Start
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```bash
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curl -fsSL https://gitea.arnodo.fr/Damien/infra-scripts/raw/branch/main/proxy/install.sh | bash
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```
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## Components
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- **Tailscale**: Private network access (SSH, admin panel)
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- **Nginx Proxy Manager**: Public reverse proxy (HTTP/HTTPS)
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- **UFW**: Firewall (only 80/443 exposed publicly)
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- **fail2ban** + **unattended-upgrades**: Basic hardening
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## Environment Variables
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| Variable | Default | Description |
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|----------|---------|-------------|
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| `PROXY_HOSTNAME` | `proxy` | Server hostname |
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| `TZ` | `Europe/Paris` | Timezone |
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Example:
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```bash
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PROXY_HOSTNAME=myproxy TZ=America/New_York curl -fsSL https://gitea.arnodo.fr/Damien/infra-scripts/raw/branch/main/proxy/install.sh | bash
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```
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## What it does
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1. Sets hostname
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2. Installs base packages (vim, fail2ban, unattended-upgrades, at)
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3. Installs and connects Tailscale (will prompt for authentication)
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4. Configures sysctl for exit-node capability
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5. Installs Docker
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6. Configures UFW (80/443 public, everything else via Tailscale only)
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7. Deploys Nginx Proxy Manager
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8. Exposes NPM admin panel via Tailscale serve
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9. Temporarily opens SSH port 22 for 5 minutes (safety net)
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## SSH Safety Net
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During installation, SSH port 22 is temporarily opened for 5 minutes to prevent lockout if you're connected via public IP. After 5 minutes, it will be automatically closed and only Tailscale SSH will work.
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```bash
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# List scheduled jobs
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sudo atq
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# Cancel the scheduled SSH closure (replace N with job number)
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sudo atrm N
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# Manually close SSH port 22 if needed
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sudo ufw delete allow 22/tcp
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```
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## Post-install
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- Access NPM admin: `https://proxy.<your-tailnet>.ts.net`
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- Default credentials: `admin@example.com` / `changeme`
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- Optionally approve exit-node in Tailscale admin console
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## Centralized log reception (rsyslog)
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A fail2ban jail running inside an exposed service's own LXC only ever sees
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this proxy's tailnet IP as the connection source, so it would end up
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banning the proxy itself instead of the actual client. Detection has to
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stay where the signal is (the service's application log); banning has to
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happen here, where public connections terminate. Services forward their
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logs to this proxy over TCP so a jail here can act on them.
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| File | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| `/etc/rsyslog.d/10-remote-receiver.conf` | Generic `imtcp` listener, port `RSYSLOG_PORT` (default `5514`). Anything not claimed by a more specific routing file lands in `/var/log/remote/<sender-hostname>.log`. |
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| `/etc/rsyslog.d/50-<service>.conf` | One per exposed service. Routes by tag/programname into that service's own logfile for its dedicated fail2ban jail. |
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| `/etc/logrotate.d/remote-logs` | Rotation for everything under `/var/log/remote/` (`copytruncate`, so fail2ban never loses its file descriptor across a rotation). |
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Adding a new exposed service is a matter of dropping its `50-<service>.conf`
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here — nothing else in this list needs to change. A minimal example that
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routes messages tagged `myservice` into their own file, in addition to the
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generic catch-all:
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```
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$RuleSet remoteLogs
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if $programname == 'myservice' then {
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action(type="omfile" file="/var/log/myservice/myservice.log")
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}
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$RuleSet RSYSLOG_DefaultRuleset
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```
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`RSYSLOG_PORT` and `RSYSLOG_BIND_ADDR` (default `0.0.0.0`) are overridable
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via environment. The default bind is safe as-is: UFW's default-deny only
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opens `80/tcp` and `443/tcp` publicly, so port `5514` is reachable
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exclusively over `tailscale0` regardless of the bind address. Binding to
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the tailnet IP directly was considered and rejected — it would require
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`tailscale up` to have already succeeded before rsyslog is configured,
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which complicates the script's flow (a missing `TS_AUTHKEY` is tolerated
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today). The residual risk is log injection from anything that reaches the
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port (which can trigger a false fail2ban ban); narrow `RSYSLOG_BIND_ADDR`
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to a specific tailnet IP if that risk becomes a concern.
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