Gitea returns HTTP 200 on a failed web login (the page is simply re-rendered with an error), so the existing traefik-auth jail, which matches on DownstreamStatus, is structurally blind to brute force on the login form. Adds a dedicated gitea-auth jail reading the forwarded application log (routed by the new 50-gitea.conf on top of #20's generic receiver), plus a Traefik-side rate limit on /user/login, /user/sign_up and /user/forgot_password as a second layer. [DEFAULT] ignoreip in jail.local guards every jail (not just gitea-auth) so a misconfigured X-Forwarded-For chain can't ban the tailnet itself — this must be in place before the jail, since the whole point is to make that failure mode structurally impossible rather than caught after the fact. conf.d/gitea.yml gains a highest-priority router that denies public access to /metrics (ipAllowList limited to loopback) while leaving it reachable on the tailnet, where Gitea's own tailscale serve answers directly. The backend also moves to https://gitea.taila5ad8.ts.net (443, no port) — the result of #19's tailscale serve --https=443 — which is NOT compatible with the previous :3000 backend of the old community-scripts deployment; only apply once the data migration has actually happened. Verified with real fail2ban/rsyslog/Traefik v3 in disposable containers: the gitea filter matches real failure log lines and misses the normal login-page line; 5 failed logins from an external IP bans it while 5 from the Tailscale CGNAT range never do (ignoreip in effect); a forwarded "gitea"-tagged message lands in /var/log/gitea/gitea.log; Traefik loads all three routers, both middlewares, and the stated priorities without error. Closes #21
504 lines
18 KiB
Bash
504 lines
18 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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# install.sh - Automated deployment of Proxy Server with Tailscale + Traefik v3 + Fail2ban
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# Usage: curl -fsSL https://gitea.arnodo.fr/Damien/infra-scripts/raw/branch/main/proxy/install.sh | bash
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set -euo pipefail
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# Colors for logging
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RED='\033[0;31m'
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GREEN='\033[0;32m'
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YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
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NC='\033[0m'
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log_info() { echo -e "${GREEN}[INFO]${NC} $1"; }
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log_warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"; }
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log_error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1"; }
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# Pre-flight checks
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check_root() {
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if [[ $EUID -eq 0 ]]; then
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log_error "Do not run as root directly. Use a user with sudo privileges."
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exit 1
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fi
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if ! sudo -v; then
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log_error "User must have sudo privileges."
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exit 1
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fi
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}
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check_debian() {
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if ! grep -qi debian /etc/os-release 2>/dev/null; then
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log_warn "This script is optimized for Debian. Continuing anyway..."
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fi
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}
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# Configuration variables (can be overridden via environment)
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PROXY_HOSTNAME="${PROXY_HOSTNAME:-proxy}"
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TRAEFIK_DIR="$HOME/traefik"
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# ACME_EMAIL is required for Let's Encrypt certificate issuance notifications.
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# Export it before running: export ACME_EMAIL=you@example.com
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ACME_EMAIL="${ACME_EMAIL:-}"
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# Optional: pre-authorize Tailscale non-interactively (recommended for curl|bash).
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# Generate at https://login.tailscale.com/admin/settings/keys
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TS_AUTHKEY="${TS_AUTHKEY:-}"
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# rsyslog receiver for exposed services' logs (see "Configuring rsyslog" below).
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RSYSLOG_PORT="${RSYSLOG_PORT:-5514}"
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# Default 0.0.0.0 is fine: UFW's default-deny only opens 80/443 publicly, so
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# this port is reachable exclusively over tailscale0 either way. Override to
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# a specific tailnet IP to shrink the blast radius of log injection instead.
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RSYSLOG_BIND_ADDR="${RSYSLOG_BIND_ADDR:-0.0.0.0}"
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main() {
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log_info "=== Proxy Server Deployment (Traefik v3) ==="
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check_root
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check_debian
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# Prompt for ACME email if not set. Only attempt interactive prompt when a
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# TTY is available — when invoked via `curl … | bash`, stdin is the pipe
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# and reading from /dev/tty may also fail (e.g. non-interactive runners).
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if [[ -z "$ACME_EMAIL" ]]; then
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if [[ -r /dev/tty ]]; then
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log_warn "ACME_EMAIL is not set in the environment."
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read -rp "Enter your ACME email address: " ACME_EMAIL < /dev/tty || true
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fi
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if [[ -z "$ACME_EMAIL" ]]; then
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log_error "ACME_EMAIL is required. Export it before running:"
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log_error " export ACME_EMAIL=you@example.com"
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exit 1
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fi
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fi
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if [[ "$(hostname)" != "$PROXY_HOSTNAME" ]]; then
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log_info "Setting hostname to: $PROXY_HOSTNAME"
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echo "$PROXY_HOSTNAME" | sudo tee /etc/hostname > /dev/null
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sudo hostnamectl set-hostname "$PROXY_HOSTNAME"
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else
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log_info "Hostname already set to $PROXY_HOSTNAME, skipping."
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fi
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log_info "Installing base packages..."
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sudo apt update -qq
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sudo apt install -y -qq vim ca-certificates curl gnupg lsb-release fail2ban unattended-upgrades ufw ethtool networkd-dispatcher rsyslog > /dev/null
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log_info "Installing Tailscale..."
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curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
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log_info "Configuring sysctl for exit-node support..."
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echo 'net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1' | sudo tee /etc/sysctl.d/99-tailscale.conf > /dev/null
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echo 'net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 1' | sudo tee -a /etc/sysctl.d/99-tailscale.conf > /dev/null
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sudo sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/99-tailscale.conf > /dev/null
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log_info "Configuring ethtool for Tailscale UDP GRO forwarding..."
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# Determine the default-route interface and disable rx-gro-list / enable
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# rx-udp-gro-forwarding to avoid the Tailscale throughput warning.
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NETDEV=$(ip -o route show default | awk '{print $5; exit}')
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if [[ -z "$NETDEV" ]]; then
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log_error "Could not determine default network interface."
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exit 1
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fi
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sudo ethtool -K "$NETDEV" rx-udp-gro-forwarding on rx-gro-list off
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# Persist across reboots via networkd-dispatcher
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sudo mkdir -p /etc/networkd-dispatcher/routable.d
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printf '#!/bin/sh\nethtool -K %s rx-udp-gro-forwarding on rx-gro-list off\n' "$NETDEV" \
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| sudo tee /etc/networkd-dispatcher/routable.d/50-tailscale > /dev/null
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sudo chmod 755 /etc/networkd-dispatcher/routable.d/50-tailscale
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# Connect to Tailscale only if not already logged in (idempotent re-runs).
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if ! sudo tailscale status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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log_info "Connecting to Tailscale..."
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if [[ -n "$TS_AUTHKEY" ]]; then
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sudo tailscale up --ssh --advertise-exit-node --authkey="$TS_AUTHKEY"
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else
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log_warn "TS_AUTHKEY not set — interactive browser auth required."
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sudo tailscale up --ssh --advertise-exit-node
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fi
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else
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log_info "Tailscale already connected, skipping."
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fi
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log_info "Installing Docker..."
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sudo mkdir -m 0755 -p /etc/apt/keyrings
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curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/debian/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg
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echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg] https://download.docker.com/linux/debian $(lsb_release -cs) stable" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list > /dev/null
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sudo apt update -qq
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sudo apt install -y -qq docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-compose-plugin > /dev/null
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log_info "Adding current user to docker group..."
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sudo usermod -aG docker "$USER"
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log_info "Configuring UFW firewall..."
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# Idempotent: only reset if our marker rules are absent. This preserves any
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# rules added later by the operator on re-runs.
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if ! sudo ufw status | grep -q "tailscale0"; then
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sudo ufw --force reset > /dev/null
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sudo ufw default deny incoming > /dev/null
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sudo ufw default allow outgoing > /dev/null
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# Allow HTTP/HTTPS from the public internet (handled by Traefik)
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sudo ufw allow 80/tcp > /dev/null
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sudo ufw allow 443/tcp > /dev/null
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# Allow all traffic on Tailscale interface (dashboard, metrics, SSH, admin — everything internal)
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sudo ufw allow in on tailscale0 > /dev/null
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# Port 22 is intentionally NOT opened publicly; Tailscale SSH covers management access
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sudo ufw --force enable > /dev/null
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else
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log_info "UFW already configured, skipping reset."
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fi
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log_info "Configuring Fail2ban for Traefik..."
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# Create the log file and fail2ban socket dir now so:
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# - fail2ban can open the log file when the jail loads.
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# - docker doesn't bind-mount /var/run/fail2ban as an empty dir if the
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# exporter container starts before fail2ban writes its socket.
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sudo mkdir -p /var/log/traefik /var/run/fail2ban
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sudo chown "$USER":"$USER" /var/log/traefik
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sudo touch /var/log/traefik/access.log
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# DEFAULT ignoreip guards every jail below, including gitea-auth: a
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# misconfigured X-Forwarded-For chain must never be able to ban the
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# tailnet itself. 100.64.0.0/10 is Tailscale's CGNAT range.
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sudo tee /etc/fail2ban/jail.local > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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[DEFAULT]
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ignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1 100.64.0.0/10
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EOF
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sudo tee /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/traefik.conf > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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[Definition]
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# Match JSON log lines where ClientHost is the offending IP and DownstreamStatus
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# is an auth/abuse status (401, 403, 429) or a server error (5xx).
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# Legitimate 404s on missing assets are excluded so dev traffic doesn't ban users.
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# Two patterns cover both possible field orderings in the JSON.
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failregex = ^.*"ClientHost":"<HOST>".*"DownstreamStatus":(401|403|429|5[0-9]{2})
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^.*"DownstreamStatus":(401|403|429|5[0-9]{2}).*"ClientHost":"<HOST>"
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ignoreregex =
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EOF
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sudo tee /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/traefik.conf > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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[traefik-auth]
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enabled = true
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filter = traefik
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logpath = /var/log/traefik/access.log
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maxretry = 10
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findtime = 5m
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bantime = 1h
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action = iptables-multiport[name=traefik, port="80,443", protocol=tcp]
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EOF
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log_info "Configuring Fail2ban for Gitea..."
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# Gitea returns HTTP 200 on a failed web login (the page is simply
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# re-rendered with an error) — the traefik-auth jail above, which
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# matches on DownstreamStatus, is structurally blind to brute force on
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# the login form. This jail reads the application log instead
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# (forwarded via rsyslog below), which does log failed attempts.
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sudo mkdir -p /var/log/gitea
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sudo tee /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/gitea.conf > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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[Definition]
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failregex = .*(Failed authentication attempt|invalid credentials|Attempted access of unknown user).* from <HOST>
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ignoreregex =
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EOF
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sudo tee /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/gitea.conf > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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[gitea-auth]
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enabled = true
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filter = gitea
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logpath = /var/log/gitea/gitea.log
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maxretry = 5
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findtime = 10m
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bantime = 1h
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action = iptables-multiport[name=gitea, port="80,443", protocol=tcp]
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EOF
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sudo systemctl restart fail2ban
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log_info "Configuring rsyslog receiver for exposed services..."
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# A fail2ban jail running inside a service's own LXC only ever sees this
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# proxy's tailnet IP as the source of connections, so it would end up
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# banning the proxy itself. Detection has to stay where the signal is
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# (the service's application log); banning has to happen here, at the
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# edge where public connections actually terminate. Services forward
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# their logs to this receiver over TCP; adding a new one is a matter of
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# dropping a 50-<service>.conf here (see proxy/README.md) — nothing else
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# to touch.
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sudo mkdir -p /var/log/remote
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sudo tee /etc/rsyslog.d/10-remote-receiver.conf > /dev/null << EOF
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module(load="imtcp")
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\$RuleSet remoteLogs
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\$template RemoteLogPath,"/var/log/remote/%HOSTNAME%.log"
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*.* ?RemoteLogPath
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\$RuleSet RSYSLOG_DefaultRuleset
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input(type="imtcp" port="${RSYSLOG_PORT}" address="${RSYSLOG_BIND_ADDR}" ruleset="remoteLogs")
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EOF
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sudo tee /etc/logrotate.d/remote-logs > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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/var/log/remote/*.log {
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daily
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rotate 7
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compress
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missingok
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notifempty
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copytruncate
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}
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EOF
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log_info "Configuring rsyslog routing for Gitea..."
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# Routes the "gitea" tag (set by gitea/install.sh's imfile forwarder)
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# into its own file, on top of the generic 10-remote-receiver.conf
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# catch-all — the gitea-auth fail2ban jail above reads this file.
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sudo tee /etc/rsyslog.d/50-gitea.conf > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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$RuleSet remoteLogs
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if $programname == 'gitea' then {
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action(type="omfile" file="/var/log/gitea/gitea.log")
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stop
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}
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$RuleSet RSYSLOG_DefaultRuleset
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EOF
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sudo tee /etc/logrotate.d/gitea > /dev/null << 'EOF'
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/var/log/gitea/gitea.log {
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daily
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rotate 7
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compress
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missingok
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notifempty
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copytruncate
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}
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EOF
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sudo systemctl restart rsyslog
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log_info "Creating Traefik stack under $TRAEFIK_DIR..."
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mkdir -p "$TRAEFIK_DIR/conf.d"
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# acme.json must be 600 or Traefik refuses to use it
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touch "$TRAEFIK_DIR/acme.json"
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chmod 600 "$TRAEFIK_DIR/acme.json"
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# --- docker-compose.yml ---
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# SECURITY: The dashboard/API entrypoint is bound to 127.0.0.1 ONLY.
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# Combined with `api.insecure: true` in traefik.yml, the dashboard has no
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# authentication — it is only reachable via the host loopback and exposed
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# selectively over the tailnet through `tailscale serve`. DO NOT change
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# this port binding to 0.0.0.0 or any non-loopback address.
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cat > "$TRAEFIK_DIR/docker-compose.yml" << 'EOF'
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services:
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traefik:
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image: traefik:v3
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container_name: traefik
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restart: unless-stopped
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dns:
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- 100.100.100.100
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ports:
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- "80:80"
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- "443:443"
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# MUST stay on 127.0.0.1: dashboard is unauthenticated (see traefik.yml).
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- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
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volumes:
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- ./traefik.yml:/etc/traefik/traefik.yml:ro
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- ./conf.d:/etc/traefik/conf.d:ro
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- ./acme.json:/acme.json
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- /var/log/traefik:/var/log/traefik
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- /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro
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fail2ban-exporter:
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image: registry.gitlab.com/hctrdev/fail2ban-prometheus-exporter:latest
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container_name: fail2ban-exporter
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restart: unless-stopped
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user: root
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ports:
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# Metrics reachable only via Tailscale (127.0.0.1 binding + UFW blocks public access)
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- "127.0.0.1:9191:9191"
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volumes:
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# Mount the directory, not the socket file: avoids Docker creating a directory
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# at the path when fail2ban is briefly down and recreating its socket.
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- /var/run/fail2ban:/var/run/fail2ban
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EOF
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# --- traefik.yml (static config) ---
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# Unquoted EOF: ${ACME_EMAIL} must expand at write time into the static config.
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cat > "$TRAEFIK_DIR/traefik.yml" << EOF
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entryPoints:
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web:
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address: ":80"
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http:
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redirections:
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entryPoint:
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to: websecure
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scheme: https
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websecure:
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address: ":443"
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traefik:
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address: ":8080"
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certificatesResolvers:
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letsencrypt:
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acme:
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email: "${ACME_EMAIL}"
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storage: /acme.json
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httpChallenge:
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entryPoint: web
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providers:
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file:
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directory: /etc/traefik/conf.d
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watch: true
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metrics:
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prometheus:
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addEntryPointsLabels: true
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addServicesLabels: true
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addRoutersLabels: true
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entryPoint: traefik
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api:
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dashboard: true
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# insecure exposes the dashboard on the :8080 entrypoint without auth.
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# This is acceptable ONLY because docker-compose.yml binds 8080 to 127.0.0.1.
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# Public reach requires going through `tailscale serve` (tailnet-authenticated).
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insecure: true
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accessLog:
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filePath: /var/log/traefik/access.log
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format: json
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EOF
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# --- conf.d/gitea.yml (dynamic config) ---
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# NOTE: backend is https://gitea.taila5ad8.ts.net (443, no port) — the
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# result of gitea/install.sh (#19) moving to `tailscale serve
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# --https=443`. This is NOT compatible with the previous :3000 backend
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# of the old community-scripts deployment; only apply this once the
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# data migration to the new instance has actually happened.
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cat > "$TRAEFIK_DIR/conf.d/gitea.yml" << 'EOF'
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http:
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routers:
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# /metrics carries the Prometheus bearer token; never expose it publicly.
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# Highest priority so it wins over the catch-all "gitea" router below.
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gitea-metrics-deny:
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rule: "Host(`gitea.arnodo.fr`) && PathPrefix(`/metrics`)"
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priority: 200
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entryPoints:
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- websecure
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service: gitea
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middlewares:
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- deny-public
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tls:
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certResolver: letsencrypt
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# Gitea returns HTTP 200 on a failed web login, so the traefik-auth
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# jail (which matches on DownstreamStatus) can't see login brute
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# force. Rate-limit the login/signup/forgot-password surface directly
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# as a second layer on top of the gitea-auth fail2ban jail.
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gitea-auth:
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rule: "Host(`gitea.arnodo.fr`) && (Path(`/user/login`) || Path(`/user/sign_up`) || Path(`/user/forgot_password`))"
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priority: 100
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entryPoints:
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- websecure
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service: gitea
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middlewares:
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- auth-ratelimit
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tls:
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certResolver: letsencrypt
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gitea:
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rule: "Host(`gitea.arnodo.fr`)"
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priority: 1
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entryPoints:
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- websecure
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service: gitea
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tls:
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certResolver: letsencrypt
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middlewares:
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auth-ratelimit:
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rateLimit:
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average: 6
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period: 1m
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burst: 12
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deny-public:
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ipAllowList:
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sourceRange:
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- "127.0.0.1/32"
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services:
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gitea:
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loadBalancer:
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servers:
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- url: "https://gitea.taila5ad8.ts.net"
|
|
EOF
|
|
|
|
log_info "Starting Traefik stack..."
|
|
# Use sg to apply the docker group without requiring a re-login.
|
|
# cd into the dir so paths inside the command don't break on spaces in $HOME.
|
|
(cd "$TRAEFIK_DIR" && sg docker -c "docker compose up -d")
|
|
|
|
# Idempotent: only register the serve mapping if it isn't already present.
|
|
# Use --json (stable contract) and capture stdout+stderr so any help/error
|
|
# output on older tailscale builds doesn't leak to the user's terminal.
|
|
if ! sudo tailscale serve status --json 2>&1 | grep -q '"127.0.0.1:8080"'; then
|
|
log_info "Exposing Traefik dashboard via Tailscale serve..."
|
|
sudo tailscale serve --bg http://localhost:8080
|
|
else
|
|
log_info "Tailscale serve already configured for dashboard, skipping."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
log_info "Configuring MOTD..."
|
|
# /etc/profile.d/ runs for every interactive login shell regardless of the SSH
|
|
# implementation (works for both Tailscale SSH and regular OpenSSH).
|
|
cat << 'MOTD' | sudo tee /etc/profile.d/00-proxy.sh > /dev/null
|
|
TS_FQDN=$(tailscale status --json 2>/dev/null | awk -F'"' '
|
|
/"Self"/ { in_self=1 }
|
|
in_self && /"DNSName"/ { gsub(/\.$/, "", $4); print $4; exit }
|
|
')
|
|
[[ -z "$TS_FQDN" ]] && TS_FQDN="$(hostname).ts.net"
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo " ____ ____ _____ ____ __"
|
|
echo "| _ \| _ \ / _ \ \/ /\ \ / /"
|
|
echo "| |_) | |_) | | | \ / \ V /"
|
|
echo "| __/| _ <| |_| / \ | |"
|
|
echo "|_| |_| \_\\___/_/\_\ |_|"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "Traefik v3 Reverse Proxy"
|
|
echo "─────────────────────────────────────────"
|
|
echo "Access:"
|
|
echo " • Dashboard : https://${TS_FQDN} (Tailscale)"
|
|
echo " • HTTP/HTTPS: Public ports 80/443"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "Services:"
|
|
docker ps --format ' • {{.Names}} : {{.Status}}' 2>/dev/null || echo " Docker not running"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "Useful commands:"
|
|
echo " cd ~/traefik && docker compose logs -f"
|
|
echo " sudo tailscale serve status"
|
|
echo "─────────────────────────────────────────"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
MOTD
|
|
|
|
TS_FQDN=$(tailscale status --json 2>/dev/null | awk -F'"' '
|
|
/"Self"/ { in_self=1 }
|
|
in_self && /"DNSName"/ { gsub(/\.$/, "", $4); print $4; exit }
|
|
' || echo "${PROXY_HOSTNAME}.ts.net")
|
|
|
|
echo ""
|
|
log_info "=========================================="
|
|
log_info "Deployment complete!"
|
|
log_info "=========================================="
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "Traefik dashboard : https://${TS_FQDN}"
|
|
echo "Stack directory : $TRAEFIK_DIR"
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "Note: Approve exit-node in Tailscale admin console if needed."
|
|
echo "Note: Fail2ban is running on the host; fail2ban-exporter exposes"
|
|
echo " metrics on port 9191 (Tailscale-only, not public)."
|
|
echo ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
main "$@"
|